A Simple and Secure Key Agreement Protocol to Integrate a Key Distribution Procedure into the DSS

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Abstract

A simple and secure method to integrate the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange into the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) is presented in this paper. Two parties are able to establish a DH key securely between them over a public channel so our message can be encrypted. We have demonstrated how the replay attack and known key attack can be defeated. And our extended proposed protocol can be achieved with the mutual authentication requirement.

Keywords: Cryptography, Data security, Digital signature, Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Key exchange

1. Introduction

In a public communication channel, it is difficult to require any two parties to keep a pre-established secret key before a communication is set up. It means an uncountable size of key table is needed to maintain secretly. The key distribution scheme proposed by Diffie and Hellman (DH) was the first public key algorithm to solve this problem [5][19]. The DH key exchange can be used for the key distribution, where two parties can use the algorithm to establish a secret key over insecure channels by using a public communication only [3][8][9][12][14]. However, it cannot be used to encrypt and decrypt messages. The DH key exchange is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack so that the communicating parties cannot ensure who is on the other side actually when running the DH key exchange algorithm [4][20-21][30-31]. Therefore, a signature to the exchanged key is needed [1-2][7][10-11][15-18][24-29][32-33].

In 1993, Arazi suggested that the integration of the DH key exchange with the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), which introduced by Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [13][22] could provide a compact key distribution scheme [1]. The scheme gives “free of charge” to the DH key exchange when the modular exponentiation operations are executed when both the DSA and the DH key exchange are integrated. Later, Nyberg and Rueppel pointed out the exchanged shared secret keys (DH keys) were not mutually independent; if one of the secret key was compromised, then the others would be revealed as well [23]. In 2004, Harn et al. extended Arazi’s approach and proposed three different protocols to integrate the DH key exchange with the DSA for an authenticated exchanged key securely [6]. However, Harn et al. need an assumption in their protocols, which implies that the public key of a receiver should be known by a sender before running the protocols.

It should be noted that, by using Arazi’s scheme, without the knowledge of the public key of the opposite side, a party is able to establish a DH key with the other side directly over a public channel. The party simply replaces the message in the DSA with a DH key exchange element, e.g. \( g^e \mod p \), and sends it to the other party with the corresponding signature and certificate.

1 Partial results have been published in ICNIT 2012
The receiver can check the signature by using the information recorded in the certificate. Then, the receiver performs the similar operations as the sender. Consequently, a shared secret key $K$ can be established.

However, by using Harn et al.’s protocol, a party needs to know the public key of the receiver before they can establish a shared secret key securely. Although the requirement that the parties should know each other’s public key is not considered to be a big disadvantage, we consider this additional requirement has already violated Arazi’s original conception of the work, which means that a party who lacks the public key of the opposite side at the moment can also establish a shared secret key securely by using the DH + DSA algorithm. We deem that this is the essence of the DH key exchange, as well as Arazi’s original conception of the work.

On the other hand, we consider the previous protocols [1][6] are vulnerable to replay attack. An attacker simply intercepts the old messages $m_A$, $s_A$ sent by user $A$, and then replays them to the user $B$ afterward; user $B$ is unable to determine if it is a replay or not, and vice versa. We shall demonstrate how this attack can be defeated without increasing the computation burden of the parties.

In this paper, a simple method is proposed to secure the scheme proposed by Arazi. We will present how the known key attack shown by Nyberg and Rueppel as well as the replay attack can be prevented, and our extended proposed protocol can achieve the mutual authentication.

![Figure 1. The flowchart of proposed method](image)

2. The Proposed Protocol

In this section, we will introduce our proposed protocol. In our proposed protocol, suppose that there are two parties, $A$ and $B$, and they will establish a shared secret key $K$ by the public channel. Then we will introduce the extended protocol if we can know the public key of the receiver before the transmission. The extended protocol can not only establish a shared secret key $K$, but also achieve the mutual authentication requirement.
2.1. Notations

We first give some notations used in our proposed protocol. In DSA, \( p \) is a large prime number with \( L \) bits in length, \( 2^{L-1} < p < 2^L \), \( 512 \leq L \leq 1024 \), and \( L \) is a multiple of 64; \( q \) is another large prime, where \( 2^{159} < q < 2^{160} \) and \( q|(p-1); g \) is an integer of multiplicative order \( q \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_p; g = h^{(p-1)/q} \mod p \), where \( 1 < h < p-1; x(0 < x < q) \) is a user’s private key; \( y = g^x \mod p \) represents the corresponding public key; \( \{p, q, g, y\} \) are public values; \( H(\cdot) \) is a one-way hash function, yielding a 160-bit output.

2.2. The proposed method

In our proposed protocol, there are three steps to establish the secret key \( K \) between Party \( A \) and Party \( B \). Figure 1 is the flowchart of the proposed protocol, and the proposed protocol is described as follows.

i. Party \( A \) randomly selects a secret value \( v \in \mathbb{Z}_q, 0 < v < q \), and \( A \) computes \( m_A, r_A, \) and \( s_A \) as follows:

\[
m_A = g^v \mod p, \quad r_A = m_A \mod q, \quad s_A = v^{-1}[H(m_A \| t_A) + x_Ar_A] \mod q. \tag{1}
\]

Next, \( A \) sends \( (m_A, t_A, s_A) \) to \( B \), where \( t_A \) is a timestamp of \( A \).

ii. Upon receiving \((m_B, t_B, s_B)\), party \( B \) verifies \( t_B \). If \( t_B \) is fresh, \( B \) computes \( r_B = m_B \mod q \) and verifies \( A \)'s DSA signature \((r_A, s_A)\) on message \( m_A \) and \( t_A \). If the condition is observed, \( B \) selects a secret value \( w \in \mathbb{Z}_q, 0 < w < q \). \( B \) computes \( m_B, r_B, \) the shared secret key \( K \), and \( s_B \) as follows:

\[
m_B = g^w \mod p, \quad r_B = m_B \mod q, \quad K = m_A^w \mod p, \quad s_B = w^{-1}[H(m_B \| K \| t_B) + x_Br_B] \mod q. \tag{2}
\]

Next, \( B \) sends \( (m_B, t_B, s_B) \), where \( t_B \) is a timestamp of \( B \).

iii. After party \( A \) receiving \((m_B, t_B, s_B)\), \( A \) first verifies whether \( t_B \) is fresh or not. If \( t_B \) is fresh, \( A \) computes \( r_A = m_A \mod q, K = m_A^w \mod p \), and verifies \( B \)'s signature \((r_B, s_B)\) on \( H(m_B \| K \| t_B) \). If the verification holds, it means the shared secret key \( K = (g^w)^x \mod p = (g^v)^x \mod p \) between \( A \) and \( B \) is established.

2.3. The extended protocol

In Harn et al.’s protocol, a party needs to know the public key of the receiver before they can establish a shared secret key securely. If we can know the public key of the receiver, we can achieve the external mutual authentication requirement by the extended protocol. Figure 2 is the flowchart of the extended protocol, and we describe our extended protocol by the following steps:

i. Similarly, first Party \( A \) randomly selects a secret value \( v \in \mathbb{Z}_q, 0 < v < q \), and \( A \) computes \( m_A, r_A, \) and \( s_A \) by Equation (1). After computing, \( A \) sends \((m_A, t_A, s_A)\) and \( \text{Sig}_A(m_A, t_A, s_A) \) to \( B \), where \( t_A \) is a timestamp of \( A \) and \( \text{Sig}_A(m_A, t_A, s_A) \) is the signature signed by \( A \) with the private key of \( A \).

ii. Upon receiving \((m_A, t_A, s_A)\) and \( \text{Sig}_A(m_A, t_A, s_A) \), party \( B \) verifies \( t_A \). If \( t_A \) is fresh, \( B \) authenticates \( A \) by signature using the public key of \( A \). If it is true, \( B \) computes \( r_B = m_A \mod q \) and verifies \( A \)'s DSA signature \((r_A, s_A)\) on message \( m_A \) and \( t_A \). If the condition is observed, \( B \) selects a secret value \( w \in \mathbb{Z}_q, 0 < w < q \). \( B \) computes \( m_B, r_B, \) the shared secret key \( K \), and \( s_B \) by Equations (2) and (3). Next, \( B \) sends \((m_B, t_B, s_B)\) and \( \text{Sig}_B(m_B, t_B, s_B) \) to \( A \), where \( t_B \) is a
timestamp of \( B \) and \( \text{Sig}_B(m_B, t_B, s_B) \) is the signature signed by \( B \) with the private key of \( B \).

iii. After party \( A \) receiving \((m_B, t_B, s_B)\) and \( \text{Sig}_B(m_B, t_B, s_B) \), \( A \) first verifies whether \( t_B \) is fresh or not. If \( t_B \) is fresh, \( A \) authenticates \( B \) by signature using the public key of \( B \). If it is true, \( A \) computes \( r_B = m_B \mod q \), \( K = m^B \mod p \), and verifies \( B \)'s signature \((r_B, s_B)\) on \( H(m_B||K||t_B) \). If the verification holds, it means the shared secret key \( K = (g^v)^w \mod p = (g^w)^v \mod p \) between \( A \) and \( B \) is established.

### Figure 2. The flowchart of the extended method

3. Security analysis

In this section, we will analyze that our proposed protocol can defeat the replay and Nyberg and Ruppel’s known key attacks, and our extended method can achieve the mutual authentication requirement.

#### Reply attack:

Two timestamp \( t_A \) and \( t_B \) are appended to the key exchange protocol in parties \( A \) and \( B \), respectively. We strengthen the original protocol proposed by Arazi as well as Harn et al.‘s by making the replay attack being defeated. It is easy to notice that unless the receivers store every \( m_A \) or \( m_B \) respectively, the replay attack cannot be avoided in the previous protocols. We introduce the idea of timestamp to the proposed scheme in order to avoid this weakness. Because the calculation of a one-way hash function \( H(\cdot) \) is very fast and its output length is fixed, therefore, the generation of a signature \( s_A \) or \( s_B \) is still as very efficient as the previous protocols [1][6].
**Known key attack:**

In the following, we shall demonstrate how the proposed protocol can withstand Nyberg and Rueppel’s known key attack [23]. In the proposed protocol, each shared secret key $K$ between $A$ and $B$ can be expressed by publicly known or transmitted parameters, and the quantity of $g^{x_A' r_A'} \mod p$. The values of $v$, $w$, and $v w$ can be expressed by Equations (1) and (3):

$$v = s_A^{-1} [H(m_A || t_A) + x_A r_A] \mod q,$$
$$w = s_B^{-1} [H(m_B || K || t_B) + x_B r_B] \mod q,$$
$$vw = s_A^{-1} s_B^{-1} [H(m_A || t_A)H(m_B || K || t_B)] + H(m_A || t_A)x_B r_B + H(m_B || K || t_B)x_A r_A + x_A x_B r_A' r_B' \mod q.$$  \tag{4}

From Equations (2) and (4), we obtain $K^{x_A' r_A'}$ as follows:

$$K^{x_A' r_A'} = g^{H(m_B || K || t_B)} g^{H(m_B || t_B)} A^{H(m_A || t_A) A^{H(m_B || K || t_B)}} (g^{s_A r_A})^{x_A r_A'} \mod p.$$  

It is easy to see that, except $K$ and $g^{x_A' r_A'}$, all the other parameters are publicly known or sent between $A$ and $B$. Therefore, if an attacker can obtain one of the shared secret key $K$ between $A$ and $B$, he/she can retrieve $g^{x_A' r_A'}$ deservely. Assuming that the value of $K$ is compromised in the $i$ connection, an attacker can compute $g^{x_A' r_A'}$ easily. However, by using the obtained knowledge of $g^{x_A' r_A'}$, the attacker is unable to compute the shared secret key $K$ after the $i$ connections as well as before the $i$ connections. The key is that party $B$ binds the exchanged DH key $K$ with the $m_B$ to form $H(m_B || K || t_B)$ in $s_B$ in Step (ii). Therefore the knowledge of $g^{x_A' r_A'}$ is useless for breaking the exchanged DH key $K$ of others. Accordingly, the known key attack can be prevented. If one of the DH key $K$ is compromised, then the others will still remain secret.

**Mutual authentication:**

In our extended protocol, the authentication response from party $A$ is $\text{Sig}_A(m_A, t_A, s_A)$ signed by the private key $x_A$. $B$ can verify the signature by the public key of $A$ to authenticate $A$, and confirm the message is generated by $A$. Thus, $B$ can generate the secret key $K$. $A$ also can authenticate $B$ after the authentication response $\text{Sig}_B(m_B, t_B, s_B)$ from party $B$. $A$ can verify the signature $\text{Sig}_B(m_B, t_B, s_B)$ by the public key of $B$. Thus, our extended protocol can achieve the mutual authentication.

### 4. Discussion and Conclusion

We have shown how the replay attack and the flaw discussed in [23] can be avoided in this paper. The paper remains the primitive conception of the work proposed by Arazi. The parties $A$ and $B$ are able to establish a DH key $K$ securely between them over a public channel, even though they do not know the public key of the opposite party beforehand. Because the calculation of a one-way hash function $H(.)$ is very fast and its output length is fixed, therefore, the generation of signatures is still as very efficient as the previous protocols [1][6]. In our extended method, if we can know the public key of the receiver before the transmission, we can use the condition to achieve the mutual authentication requirement.

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